GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Faculty Scholarship

2005

A Model Regime of Privacy Protection (Version 2.0)
Daniel J. Solove
George Washington University Law School, dsolove@law.gwu.edu

Chris Jay Hoofnagle

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Solove, Daniel J. and Hoofnagle, Chris Jay, "A Model Regime of Privacy Protection (Version 2.0)" (2005).
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works. 930.
https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications/930

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu.

A MODEL REGIME OF PRIVACY PROTECTION
Version 2.0
by
Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle2
1

April 5, 2005
This version incorporates and responds to the many comments that we received to
Version 1.1, which we released on March 10, 2005.
Privacy protection in the United States has often been criticized, but critics have too
infrequently suggested specific proposals for reform. Recently, there has been significant
legislative interest at both the federal and state levels in addressing the privacy of personal
information. This was sparked when ChoicePoint, one of the largest data brokers in the United
States with records on almost every adult American citizen, sold data on about 145,000 people to
fraudulent businesses set up by identity thieves.3 Other companies announced security breaches,
including LexisNexis, from which personal information about 32,000 people was improperly
accessed.4 Senator Schumer criticized Westlaw for making available to certain subscribers
personal information including Social Security Numbers (SSNs).5
In the aftermath of the ChoicePoint debacle and other major information security
breaches, both of us have been asked by Congressional legislative staffers, state legislative
policymakers, journalists, academics, and others about what specifically should be done to better
regulate information privacy. In response to these questions, we believe that it is imperative to
have a discussion of concrete legislative solutions to privacy problems.
What appears below is our attempt at such an endeavor. Privacy experts have long
suggested that information collection be consistent with Fair Information Practices. This Model
Regime incorporates many of those practices and applies them specifically to the context of
commercial data brokers such as ChoicePoint. We hope that this will provide useful guidance to
legislators and policymakers in crafting laws and regulations. We also intend this to be a workin-progress in which we collaborate with others. We have welcomed input from other
academics, policymakers, journalists, and experts as well as from the industries and businesses
that will be subject to the regulations we propose. We have incorporated criticisms and
1

Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School; JD Yale. Professor Solove has discussed
many of the problems and solutions herein in his book, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (2004).
2
Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center West Coast Office; JD U. Georgia. Chris Hoofnagle has discussed
many of the problems and solutions herein in his articles, Big Brother’s Little Helpers,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=582302; and Putting Identity Theft on Ice: Freezing Credit Reports to Prevent Lending to
Impostors, http://ssrn.com/abstract=679581. Marc Rotenberg of the Electronic Privacy Information Center and Beth
Givens of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse have provided substantial comments which are incorporated in Version
1.1.
3
Bob Sullivan, Database Giant Gave Access to Fake Firms, MSNBC, Feb. 14, 2005, at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6969799/; Joseph Menn, Did the ChoicePoint End Run Backfire? L.A. Times, Mar.
13, 2005.
4
Ellen Simon, U.S. Citizens’ Data Possibly Compromised, S.F. Chronicle, Mar. 9, 2005.
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Ken Fireman, Schumer Slams Legal Service on SS Nos., Newsday, Feb. 25, 2005.
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constructive suggestions, and we will continue to update this Model Regime to include the
comments we find most helpful and illuminating.
Daniel J. Solove
dsolove@law.gwu.edu

Chris Jay Hoofnagle
hoofnagle@epic.org
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I. U.S. PRIVACY LAW AND THE DATABASE INDUSTRY
Currently, the collection and use of personal data by businesses and the government is
spinning out of control. An entire industry devoted primarily to processing and disseminating
personal information has arisen, and this industry is not well-regulated. Many companies
brokering in data have found ways to avoid being regulated by the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA), a landmark law passed in 1970 to regulate consumer reporting agencies.6 Increasingly,
the government is relying on data broker companies to supply personal data for intelligence and
law enforcement purposes as well as to analyze it. As a result, the government is navigating
around the protections of the Privacy Act,7 a law passed in 1974 to regulate the collection and
use of data by government agencies. The FCRA and Privacy Act form the basic framework that
regulates a large portion of the flow of personal data, but this framework is riddled with
exceptions and shunted with limitations. We propose a Model Regime of Privacy Protection to
address these problems.

A. The Fair Credit Reporting Act
The database industry has its roots in the rise of consumer reporting agencies -companies that gather and sell personal information on individuals for business purposes. The
consumer reporting industry began over a century ago. The first major consumer reporting
agency, Retail Credit Co., was founded in 1899, and over the years, it grew in size and expanded
its business into selling reports about individuals to insurers and employers.8
By the 1960s, significant controversy surrounded the credit reporting agencies. There
were questionable practices in the industry, including requirements that investigators fill quotas
of negative information on data subjects.9 To do this, some investigators fabricated negative
information, others included incomplete information.10 Additionally, the investigators were
collecting “lifestyle” information on data subjects, including their sexual orientation, marital
situation, drinking habits, and cleanliness.11 The credit reporting agencies were maintaining
outdated information, and in some cases, providing the file to law enforcement and to
unauthorized persons. Individuals had no right to see what was in their files. Public exposure of
the industry resulted in an extensive congressional inquiry, and it ultimately led to the passage of
the FCRA in 1970.12
The FCRA was the first federal law to regulate private-sector use and disclosure of
personal information. At the most basic level, the FCRA requires consumer reporting agencies
to maintain procedures to ensure “maximum possible accuracy.”13 The law regulates the
collection, maintenance, and dissemination of “consumer reports.” Consumer reports can only
be used for a series of enumerated purposes, such as for determining eligibility for credit or
6

Pub. L. No. 90-321, 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
Pub. L. No. 93-579, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
8
ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN'S WEB SITE, PRIVACY AND SECURITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE
INTERNET 316 (2000).
9
Id. at 316-21
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Pub. L. No. P.L. 90-321 (May 29, 1968).
13
15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
7
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engaging in employment background checks.14 Consumer reporting agencies must allow people
access to their records and must provide a telephone number for people to call in the event of a
complaint.15 Consumer reporting agencies must investigate any mistakes that people point out in
their files.16 Any user of a credit report that takes adverse action on a person based on a
consumer report must notify the person about this fact.17 When employers (both perspective and
current) want to examine a person’s credit report, they must first obtain the person’s consent.18
If the employer takes any adverse action based on the report, the employer must inform the
person and provide instructions to obtain a copy of the report.19 Under the FCRA, law
enforcement has a number of avenues to access consumer reports, some of which require an
annual accounting to Congress. Full consumer reports can be accessed by court order, by grand
jury subpoena, or by request of a child support enforcement agency.20 The Act allows the FBI
access to individuals’ account information and identifying information for counterintelligence
purposes upon written request.21

B. The Privacy Act
The Privacy Act of 1974 was created in response to concerns about how the creation and
use of computerized databases might impact individuals’ privacy rights.22 As technology
advanced through the 1960s and 70s, it became easier for agencies to cross-reference
individuals’ personal data. Citizens and legislators began to contemplate the ways that this
information, if compiled, could be abused. In 1973, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) issued a report recommending that Congress enact legislation adopting a Code
of Fair Information Practices for record systems containing personal data.23 This Code consisted
of the following principles:
There must be no personal data record-keeping system whose very existence is secret.
There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him is in a record and
how it is used.
There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that was obtained for one
purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his consent.
There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable information
about him.
Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable personal
data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take precaution to
prevent misuse of the data.

The HEW Report also raised concerns about the use of the Social Security number
14

15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
15 U.S.C. § 1681g.
16
15 U.S.C. § 1681i.
17
§1681m(a).
18
§1681b(b).
19
§1681b(b).
20
15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
21
15 U.S.C. § 1681u.
22
PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1995).
23
U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare, Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated
Personal Data Systems, Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, (The HEW Report) (1973).
15
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(SSN), which was fast becoming a “standard universal identifier” that would link all of the
records kept on a person by all agencies. The HEW Report recommended that the use of SSNs
should be strictly curbed.24
The Privacy Act grew out of the HEW Report. The Act requires government agencies to
show an individual any records kept on him or her.25 It requires agencies to follow the Fair
Information Practices when gathering and handling personal data.26 Agencies must provide
people with access and correction rights; must limit data collection to only the information
necessary to fulfill a specified government function; and must destroy data after a certain period
of time. The Act places restrictions on how agencies can share an individual’s data with other
people and agencies.27 Finally, the Act permits individuals to sue government agencies for
violations.28The FCRA and Privacy Act have thus provided a basic framework of privacy
protection, with the FCRA addressing the key private sector uses of personal data and the
Privacy Act addressing public sector uses.

C. The Database Industry
A number of companies have arisen apart from the consumer reporting agencies or have
spun off of the consumer reporting agencies. These companies’ primary business is gathering,
analyzing, and disseminating personal data. One such company is ChoicePoint, Inc., based in
Alpharetta, Georgia, which spun off from consumer reporting agency Equifax in 1997.29
ChoicePoint sells information and data services to insurers, businesses, government agencies,
and direct marketers.30 In 2004, the company reported total revenue of nearly one billion
dollars.31 :
In its short history, ChoicePoint has managed to attain a large share of the commercial
data broker market with strategic purchases of other businesses. In 2000, ChoicePoint purchased
DBT Online, Inc., a successful commercial data broker that provides “AutoTrackXP,” a favored
law enforcement-oriented service.32 In all, ChoicePoint has acquired over 50 database
companies.33 Choicepoint has 100,000 clients, and sells services to 7,000 federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies.34
ChoicePoint is only one of many similar types of companies. Acxiom is “a billion-dollar
player in the data industry, with details about nearly every adult in the United States.”35 Acxiom
24

Id. at XX.
5 U.S.C. § 552a (d).
26
5 U.S.C. § 552a (e). See also Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What
Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2001).
27
5 U.S.C. § 552a (b).
28
5 U.S.C. § 552a (g).
29
Choicepoint, Form 10, Jun. 9, 1997, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1040596/000095014497-006666.txt.
30
See EPIC ChoicePoint Page, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/.
31
Choicepoint, Form 10-k, Mar. 16, 2005, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1040596/000095014405002577/g93507e10vk.htm#102.
32
ChoicePoint Corporation, SEC Form 10-K, Mar. 26, 2003.
33
ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 130 (2005).
34
After the Breach: How Secure and Accurate is Consumer Information Held by ChoicePoint and Other Data
Aggregators?, Before the California Senate Banking Committee, Mar. 30, 2005 (testimony of Don McGuffey, Vice
President, Data Strategy, Choicepoint).
35
ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 34, 37-50 (2005).
25
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provides information to marketers for profiling consumers, manages credit records, sells data for
background checks, and provides data to government agencies:
It’s not just names, ages, addresses, and telephone numbers. The computers in [Acxiom’s] rooms
also hold billions of records about marital status and families and ages of children. They track
individuals’ estimated incomes, the value of their homes, the make and price of their cars. They
maintain unlisted phone numbers and details about people’s occupations, religions, and
ethnicities. They sometimes know what some people read, what they order over the phone and
online, and where they go on vacation. . . .36

LexisNexis, a corporation owned by the UK-based Reed Elsevier, offers access to
numerous databases and information retrieval services.37 Through services such as its featured
search tool “SmartLinx,” LexisNexis offers access to social security numbers, addresses,
licenses, real estate holdings, bankruptcies, liens, marital status, and other personal
information.38
ChoicePoint, Acxiom, and LexisNexis are three of the larger data brokers. There are
many other companies that comprise this industry. The database industry provides data to
companies for marketing, to the government for law enforcement purposes, to private
investigators for investigating individuals, to creditors for credit checks, and to employers for
background checks.
The government has increasingly been contracting with data brokers. For example,
ChoicePoint has multi-million dollar contracts with at least 35 federal agencies, including the
IRS and FBI.39 The United States Marshals Service uses Lexis-Nexis for “location of witnesses,
suspects, informants, criminals, parolees in criminal investigations, location of witnesses, parties
in civil actions.”40 Lexis-Nexis’ Person Tracker Plus Social Security number is a private library
“designed to meet the needs of law enforcement.”41 It provides information probably derived
from credit headers, including the name, SSN, current address, two prior addresses, aliases,
birthdate, and telephone number.42 And after 9-11, Acxiom positioned itself as “an antiterrorism company” by actively pursuing ways to manage personal information for the
government.43 Charles Morgan, Acxiom's CEO, stated after 9-11 that “we developed a sense
among the leadership at Acxiom that for this country to be a safer place [the government] had to
be able to work with information better.”44
Increasingly, the government is becoming interested in data mining technologies. Data
mining involves searching through repositories of data to find out new information by combining
existing pieces of data or to make predictions about future behavior based on patterns in the data.
One of the government’s most notable attempts to engage in data mining research was the Total
36

Id. at 129-130, 132.
LexisNexis, Company History, at http://www.lexis-nexis.com/presscenter/mediakit/history.asp (last visited Mar.
27, 2004)
38
LexisNexis, SmartLinx, at http://www.lexis-nexis.com/smartlinx/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2004)
39
SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra, at 169.
40
Exhibit B, Lexis-Nexis Select Limited Distribution Authorized Use List, Document Obtained from the United
States Marshals Service, Undated, available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02a.pdf.
41
Lexis-Nexis Fax Bulletin, Document Obtained from the United States Marshals Service, Undated, available at
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02e.pdf.
42
Id.
43
O’HARROW, supra, at 60.
44
Id. at 58.
37
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Information Awareness program, run by John Poindexter in the Department of Defense, which
received considerable media attention in late 2002.45 The idea was to gather various records
about individuals from businesses and then analyze it for patterns of terrorist behavior. Due to
sharp criticism, the Senate denied funding to the program in 2003.46 However, the development
of government data mining programs did not die with Total Information Awareness. According
to the Report of the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee (TAPAC), appointed by
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Total Information Awareness is “not unique in its
potential for data mining. TAPAC is aware of many other programs in use or under development
both within DOD and elsewhere in the government that make similar uses of personal information
concerning U.S. persons to detect and deter terrorist activities.”47
In light of the intense
criticism that Total Information Awareness generated, government agencies have moved data
mining projects underground. Increasingly, such data analysis is being outsourced to database
companies. ChoicePoint vice president James Zimbardi declared: “We do act as an intelligence
agency, gathering data, applying analytics.”48

D. The Limits of U.S. Privacy Law
The FCRA and the Privacy Act do not adequately address the activities of the database
industry. The FCRA applies to “any consumer reporting agency” that furnishes a “consumer
report.”49 The definition of “consumer reporting agency” is any person who “regularly engages”
in collecting information about consumers “for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to
third parties.”50 This definition turns on the meaning of “consumer report,” which is the key
term that defines the scope of the Act. Unfortunately, the FCRA has a poorly drafted definition
of “consumer report” that has allowed some to unduly narrow the Act’s coverage. The Act
conditions the definition of “consumer report” on how the information is used. That is, a
“consumer report” is any communication bearing on a consumer’s character or general
reputation which is used for credit evaluation, employment screening, insurance underwriting, or
licensing.51 Although the FCRA was passed to limit the uses of personal information in
evaluating people, a literal reading of its definition of “consumer report” makes the law
inapplicable if information is used for an unauthorized purpose beyond those enumerated in the
Act. One could argue, for instance, that a criminal using credit information for fraud has not
triggered the FCRA because fraud is not an authorized use. These problems in the definition of
“consumer report” have allowed data brokers to avoid being regulated by the FCRA.
The FBI uses similar reasoning to evade protections of the FCRA. In a memo justifying
the agency's reliance on services provided by commercial data broker ChociePoint, the agency
reasoned: “In this instance, none of the information which the FBI would seek to review has
been collected by ChoicePoint for any of the (FCRA) purposes.”52 The FBI further concludes
45

SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra at 168-69.
Id. at 169.
47
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
vii-x, 45-49 (2004)
48
Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Firm Quietly Finds Wealth in Information, Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 2005, at A1.
49
15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
50
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f).
51
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (emphasis added). For an account of other limitations of the FCRA, see Joel R. Reidenberg,
Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 Fed. Comm. L.J. 195 (1992).
52
Guidance Regarding the Use of ChoicePoint for Foreign Intelligence Collection or Foreign Counterterrorism
46
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that ChoicePoint is not a consumer reporting agency: “[b]ecause ChoicePoint does not collect
‘public record information’ for any of the highlighted purposes [under the FCRA], ChoicePoint
is not acting as a ‘consumer reporting agency’ for the purposes of the FCRA and the collected
information therefore does not constitute a ‘consumer report.’”53
In the absence of statutory regulation, data brokers have adopted self-regulatory rules
known as the Individual Reference Services Group (IRSG) Principles.54 The Principles set forth
a weak framework of protections, allowing companies to sell non-public personal information
“without restriction” to “qualified subscribers,” which includes law enforcement agencies.55
“Qualified subscribers” need only state a valid purpose for obtaining the information and agree
to limit redissemination of information.56 Under IRSG, individuals can only opt-out of the sale
of personal information to the “general public,” but ChoicePoint does not consider its customers
to be members of the general public.57 The IRSG Principles were carefully crafted in order to
ensure maximum flexibility by commercial data brokers. They have failed to set forth a
reasonable degree of protection for individuals, and in fact, it was while data brokers were
operating under these principles that the major privacy breaches occurred.
The FCRA also fails to provide sufficient protection against identity theft, a crime that is
rising at an alarming rate. Identity theft involves the use of a victim’s personal information to
improperly access accounts, obtain credit in the victim’s name, or otherwise engage in
transactions by masquerading as the victim. In 2003, the FTC estimated that “almost 10 million
Americans have discovered that they were the victim of some form of ID Theft within the past
year.”58 The FCRA, unfortunately, does little to prevent identity theft or to minimize its impact
on victims once it occurs. Under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of
2003, which amended FCRA, individuals can now obtain a free credit report once a year from
each of the three major consumer reporting agencies (Equifax, Trans Union, and Experian).59
And individuals can place a fraud “alert” on their records if they are victimized by identity theft,
but such alert “is often as simple as a mere entry in the ‘100-word statement’ box in credit files

Investigations, Document Obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Sept. 17, 2001, available at
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpfbia.pdf.
53
Guidance Regarding the Use of ChoicePoint for Foreign Intelligence Collection or Foreign Counterterrorism
Investigations, Document Obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Sept. 17, 2001, available at
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpfbia.pdf. A strong argument can be made that these interpretations are flawed.
The provisions of FCRA governing law enforcement access make it clear that Congress intended procedural
safeguards against disclosure of credit information, regardless of its intended use. As Dempsey and Flint note in
their review of federal privacy law and access to commercial information, some courts have ruled that when
information is collected for consumer reporting purposes, it remains a consumer report, despite the fact that it may
be employed for non-FCRA purposes. JAMES DEMPSEY & LARA FLINT, PRIVACY’S GAP: THE LARGELY NONEXISTENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT MINING OF COMMERCIAL DATA Fn. 16, May 28, 2003, available
at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/030528cdt.pdf.
54
See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE SERVICES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (Dec. 1997),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/privacy/wkshp97/irsdoc1.htm.
55
INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE SERVICES GROUP, IRSG PRINCIPLES, available at
http://west.thomson.com/bottom/irsgprin.asp.
56
Id.
57
Letter from Gina Moore, ChoicePoint, to Chris Hoofnagle, Electronic Privacy Information Center, (Feb. 21, 2003)
(emphasis in original) (on file with author).
58
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 4, 6 (Sept. 2003). For an excellent account of
the rise of identity theft, see BOB SULLIVAN, YOUR EVIL TWIN: BEHIND THE IDENTITY THEFT EPIDEMIC (2004).
59
15 U.S.C. § § 1681j.
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that’s made available to consumers who disagree with an entry made in their credit file.”60
Moreover, the alert does not stop activity in a person’s file. Instead, it acts as a warning to a
retailer that they should exercise more care in credit granting. A savvy identity thief could
continue with more fraud even with the alert present.
The Privacy Act also suffers from many problems that limit its effectiveness. It only
applies to the federal government and to private companies that are administering a system of
records for the government.61 Thus, when the information originates from the government and is
transferred to a private company, then Privacy Act requirements apply to the contractor.62
However, a database of information that originates at a data broker would not trigger the
requirements of the Privacy Act. And beyond data brokers, consumer reporting agencies are
specifically exempted from being considered a federal contractor for systems of records.63
This limitation to the Privacy Act is critical—it allows data brokers to amass huge
databases that the government is legally prohibited from creating. Then, when the government
needs the information, it can request it from the data broker. At that point, the personal
information would be subject to the Privacy Act, but law enforcement and intelligence agencies
have special exemptions under the Act that limit access, accuracy, and correction rights.64 For
example, law enforcement agencies “may promulgate rules . . . to exempt any system of records
[involving information about criminal investigation or criminal history] within the agency from
any part of [the Privacy Act].”65
The Privacy Act’s attempt to rein in the use of SSNs has been a failure. One of the
primary reasons is that the Act fails to restrict the use of SSNs by businesses or other private
sector entities. Such a restriction was proposed during the creation of the Privacy Act, but
Congress failed to include it in the Act.66 Today, SSNs are routinely used by businesses and
other entities, often as a password to gain access to accounts.
Another limitation is that the Privacy Act only applies to federal, not state or local
government agencies. Moreover, the Act has a number of major exceptions, including one that
exempts agencies when they disclose information for “any routine use” that is “compatible” with
the purpose for which the agency gathered the data.67 As Robert Gellman has observed: “This
vague formula has not created much of a substantive barrier to external disclosure of personal
information. . . . Later legislation, political pressures, and bureaucratic convenience tended to
overwhelm the law’s weak limitations.”68
In sum, the database industry is increasingly straining the regulatory regime for
information privacy established in the early 1970s. The existing regime has struggled to address
the rise of new data-trafficking companies apart from consumer reporting agencies, the
burgeoning cooperation of businesses with the government for intelligence and law enforcement
60

SULLIVAN, EVIL TWIN, supra, at 85.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(m).
62
Modification M001, Document Obtained from the United States Marshals Service, Undated, available at
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02d.pdf
63
5 U.S.C. § 552a(m)(2).
64
5 U.S.C. § 552a(k).
65
5 U.S.C. § 552a(j).
66
ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEBSITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE
INTERNET 297 (2000).
67
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).
68
Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE (Philip E. Agre
& Marc Rotenberg eds. 1997).
61
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operations, and the wide range and extent to which personal data is currently being used. While
privacy laws passed after the 1970s apply to specific kinds of records such as video rental
records and cable television records, most of these laws fail to cover the database industry.69 The
Model Regime we propose in the pages that follow is designed to address the gaps and
limitations in existing law.

II. THE MODEL REGIME
A. Notice, Consent, Control, and Access
1. Universal Notice
(a) Problem
There is no general knowledge about the companies using personal information. In order to
grant consent, gain access, or otherwise exercise one’s rights with regard to personal information
maintained by data brokers, consumer reporting agencies, and other institutions, people must
know about what institutions are collecting their data. Providing such rights without knowledge
of the companies will be meaningless. For example, in the ChoicePoint security scandal, most
people had no idea that ChoicePoint existed, let alone that it was collecting and selling their
personal data. Moreover, as the ChoicePoint security scandal demonstrates, data brokers
routinely sell personal information with little oversight about who may receive the data and how
it will be used. The problems of such a system were emphatically illustrated in Remsburg v.
Docusearch,70 where a data broker was employed by a stalker to locate and murder Amy Boyer.
ChoicePoint has repeatedly invited a national debate and discussion about data brokers, but such
a discussion cannot meaningfully take place unless people are informed about what information
data brokers have and what they do with that information.
(b) Legislative Mandate
To ensure meaningful access, opt-out, and other rights, there must be a way to provide people
with notice about all of the companies collecting their information.
(c) Specific Solution
Any company primarily engaged in interstate collection, maintenance, and/or sale of personally
identifiable information shall register with the FTC. Such registration shall include the nature of
personal information collected, the name and contact information for the data controller, as well
as a clear and concrete description of the uses to which the information is put. Data brokers shall
also disclose the types of businesses and entities to whom they disclose personal information as
well as what safeguards they have in place for vetting those entities that receive the data. This
69
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information shall be publicly disclosed by the FTC on a website and in printed materials
2. Meaningful Informed Consent
(a) Problem
Many data transfers and uses by companies occur without the meaningful informed consent of
consumers. The current regime of allowing consumers to opt-out of data sharing, as embodied in
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, is ineffective. The incentives are such that companies benefit if
they make opting out as cumbersome as possible and do not adequately inform people about the
uses of their data. As a result, very few people opt-out, and those who try find the process
difficult and time-consuming. There are, of course, many uses of information that people would
readily agree to. However, people are often provided an all-or-nothing choice – surrender total
control of information or be denied useful services or uses of information that they desire.
(b) Legislative Mandate
There must be a way to ensure that consumers can exercise meaningful informed consent about
the uses and dissemination of their personal information.
(c) Specific Solution
Companies that collect personal information should be required to first obtain an individual’s
consent before using it for an unrelated secondary use, except for reasonable investigation of
fraud. To the extent that companies endeavor to use personal information for secondary uses
without first obtaining individual consent, such uses shall be specifically authorized by statute or
regulation. For all new uses of personal information, companies must either be authorized by
statute to engage in such a use or seek the consent of the individuals to whom the information
pertains. When a company engages in any new use authorized by statute, it shall disclose such
expansion in use immediately to the FTC and the change shall be displayed clearly on the FTC
website so that individuals are aware of the change.
3. One-Step Exercise of Rights
(a) Problem
There are hundreds, possibly thousands, of companies that collect and trade in personal
information. To the extent that the law provides people with rights of access, opt-in, opt-out,
limitation of use and transfer, and so on, these rights must currently be exercised one-at-a-time at
each individual company. For example, under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, people have a right
to opt-out of the transfer of their data to third parties for marketing purposes. Many people have
dealings with a multitude of financial institutions, and opting out of each one can be onerous and
time-consuming. When data brokers are brought into the fold, this will make such exercise of
rights exponentially more difficult. Imagine the time it would take to opt-out with hundreds of
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different companies. And this example merely involves opt-out. There are many other rights
that people exercise as well, and exercising all with the multitude of companies individually will
prove nearly impossible and time-prohibitive.
(b) Legislative Mandate
To ensure the meaningful exercise of rights with regard to personal information, there must be a
way to exercise these rights in an efficient and easy manner that is centralized.
(c) Specific Solution
In conjunction with the universal notice, the FTC shall develop a centralized mechanism for
people to exercise their rights with respect to their personal information. Such a mechanism
would mimic the Do Not Call website, which allows individuals to opt-out of telemarketing and
verify their enrollment by visiting a single website. Similarly, individuals should be able to
enroll in a centralized do-not-share registry. Other rights, to address security risks, including
access and correction, will have to be administered by the individual companies maintaining
personal data. The centralized mechanism will simply provide a pointer to instructions on how
to exercise these rights with the companies maintaining data.
Those seeking to access any personal information collected on the centralized mechanism for
purposes other than those for which the mechanism was created must first obtain a court order.
Only specifically-enumerated approved purposes will be authorized. As for law enforcement
access to the data, officials will have to demonstrate probable cause and obtain only so much
information as necessary to meet the needs articulated in the showing of probable cause.
4. Individual Credit Management
(a) Problem
As the ChoicePoint snafu illustrates, individuals are not in control of the basic information that is
used for credit identification authentication. Numerous individuals and companies can access
people’s credit information without that person’s knowledge. Identity thieves take advantage of
this system, as they can seek loans or credit cards with creditors, who will check the victim’s
credit without informing the victim. Such credit checks are often the beginning steps in an
identity theft. Because these checks can occur without the victim’s knowledge or consent, the
identity thief can readily obtain credit in the victim’s name surreptitiously. Many identity thefts
would be stopped at their incipiency if only the victim had known about the access to the
victim’s credit records and could have blocked such access. Moreover, the problem exacerbates
identity thefts after they are underway because victims are unaware that they have been
victimized until months or years later.
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(b) Legislative Mandate
To ensure effective individual management of consumer reporting, there must be a way for
individuals to have knowledge when entities attempt to access their credit records and have the
ability to block such access.
(c) Specific Solution
First, notice shall be issued whenever any new person or entity makes an inquiry on or accesses
the consumer report of another. The individual can choose to receive such notice by mail,
telephone, or email. Second, unless individuals choose otherwise, credit records shall be
“frozen,” whereupon they can only be accessed by others after the individual has preapproved
the release of such records. Third, to guarantee maximum possible accuracy of consumer
reports, individuals should be entitled to free credit monitoring if they choose.
5. Access to and Accuracy of Personal Information
(a) Problem
ChoicePoint and other data brokers collect detailed dossiers of personal information on
practically every American citizen. Most people haven’t even heard of these companies. Even if
they do know about these companies, people have no way of knowing what information is
maintained about them, why it is being kept, how long it is being maintained, to whom it is being
disseminated, and how it is being used. The records maintained by these companies can have
inaccuracies. This wouldn’t matter much if the information were never used for anything
important. But the data is being used in ways that directly affect individuals – by the
government for law enforcement purposes and private investigators for investigation.
(b) Legislative Mandate
There must be a way for individuals to ensure that their personal information maintained by
various data brokers is maintained accurately and that it is not kept for an unreasonable amount
of time.
(c) Specific Solution
Individuals shall, in a centralized manner, be able to access their information and an accounting
of disclosures from data brokers at no cost. Data brokers must limit the amount of time they
maintain personal information to a reasonable period. As with consumer reporting agencies
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, a procedure shall be developed for individuals to correct
inaccuracies in their records.
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B. Security of Personal Information
6. Secure Identification
(a) Problem
Businesses and financial institutions currently grant access to people’s records when the accessor
merely supplies a Social Security Number, date of birth, mother’s maiden name, or other forms
of personal information that is either available in public records or sold by data brokers. This
makes the repositories of individuals’ personal data and their accounts woefully insecure, as
identity thieves can readily obtain the information needed to gain access and usurp control. As
the ChoicePoint security scandal illustrates, Social Security Numbers and other personal
information about hundreds of thousands of people can readily fall into the hands of identity
thieves.
(b) Legislative Mandate
There must be a way to prevent readily available pieces of personal information from being used
as passwords to gain access to people’s records and accounts.
(c) Specific Solution
Companies shall develop methods of identification which (1) are not based on publicly available
personal information or data that can readily be purchased from a data broker; and (2) can be
easily changed if they fall into the wrong hands. Whereas Social Security Numbers cannot be
changed without significant hassle, and dates of birth and mother’s maiden names cannot be
changed, identifiers such as passwords can be changed with ease. Furthermore, they are not
universal, and thus a thief with a password cannot access all of a victim’s accounts – only those
with that password. Biometric identifiers present problems because they are impossible to
change, and if they fall into the wrong hands could prove devastating for victims as well as
present ongoing risks to national security. Therefore, passwords are a cheap and effective way to
limit much identity theft and minimize the problems victims face in clearing up the damage
caused by identity theft.
7. Disclosure of Security Breaches
(a) Problem
When companies suffer security breaches that result in personal information being leaked or
falling into the hands of unauthorized third parties, the people to whom the personal information
pertains are made more vulnerable to fraud and identity theft. They often are not aware of this,
and are unable to take steps to protect themselves such as monitoring their consumer reports.
This was dramatically illustrated by the ChoicePoint security breach, which apparently was the
second time where the company had sold personal information to criminals. The first incident
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occurred in 2002 and only recently came to public light in the context of the second breach,
which had to be disclosed under California’s information security breach disclosure
requirements. ChoicePoint is not the only commercial data broker that has disclosed records to
others improperly—in 2002 and 2003 two individuals were able to crack commercial data broker
Acxiom’s databases, leading to the release of 20 million names and Social Security Numbers.71
(b) Legislative Mandate
There must be a way for individuals to learn about security breaches that result in the leakage or
improper access of their personal data.
(c) Specific Solution
Companies shall be placed under an affirmative obligation to provide direct notice to the
individuals whose data has been leaked or improperly accessed. Such a statute could be modeled
on California’s information security breach law.72 Individuals should also receive a copy of the
dossier or information given to the unauthorized party.

C. Business Access to and Use of Personal Information
8. Social Security Number Use Limitation
(a) Problem
Numerous businesses and organizations demand that a person provide a Social Security Number
and then use that number as a password for access to accounts and data. Many schools and other
organizations use Social Security Numbers on identification cards, thus ensuring that when a
wallet is lost or stolen, one’s Social Security Number is exposed. The use of Social Security
Numbers is so extensive that as simple a transaction as signing up for cell phone service often
requires disclosing one’s Social Security Number.
(b) Legislative Mandate
There must be a way to reduce the use of Social Security Numbers by private sector businesses.
(c) Specific Solution
Unless specifically authorized by statute or regulation, business and other privacy sector entities
shall be barred from using Social Security Numbers for identification purposes. A useful starting
point is the framework of protections for the Social Security Number embodied in California
law, which provides a panoply of protections for the identifier, including prohibitions on the
publication of the SSN, the embedding of a SSN in an identification document, and limits the
71
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appearance of the identifier in family court records.73
9. Access and Use Restrictions for Public Records
(a) Problem
Public records were once scattered about the country, and finding out information on individuals
involved trekking to or calling a series of different local offices. Today, massive database
companies sweep up the data in public record systems and use it to construct dossiers on
individuals for marketers, private investigators, and the government. This is what ChoicePoint
does. These uses of public records turn the justification for public records on its head. Public
records are essential for effective oversight of government activities, but commercial data
brokers have perverted this principled purpose, and now public records have become a tool of
businesses and the government to watch individuals.
(b) Legislative Mandate
There must be a way to regulate access and uses of public records that maximizes exposure of
government activities and minimizes the disclosure of personal information about individuals.
(c) Specific Solution
Access to personal information in public records shall be restricted for certain purposes. For
example, accessing public records to obtain data for commercial solicitation should be
prohibited. Other purposes shall be permitted: monitoring the government, research, educational
purposes, tracing property ownership, and other traditional non-commercial purposes. Data
brokers obtaining such data should be required to promise via contract, in return for receiving
such data, to be subject to reasonable use restrictions on that data and to demand that those to
whom the data is transferred also restrict uses and transfers. Such regulation would have allowed
for greater control over ChoicePoint’s use of personal data, since it obtained a significant amount
of its information from public records. Additionally, federal, state, and local agencies that
maintain public record systems must make substantial efforts to limit the disclosure of Social
Security Numbers, phone numbers, addresses, and dates of birth.
10. Curbing Excessive Uses of Background Checks
(a) Problem
Background checks are cheaper now than ever before, leading to a situation where individuals
are being screened for even menial jobs. We risk altering our society to one where the individual
can never escape a youthful indiscretion or a years-old arrest, even for a minor infraction. Preemployment screens are frequently being used by employers even for jobs that do not involve
73
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security-related functions, the handling of large sums of money, or the supervision of children or
the elderly.
(b) Legislative Mandate
There must be a way to limit the use of background checks to those jobs where there is a
reasonable and justifiable need.
(c) Specific Solution
Background checks should only be performed in contexts where fiduciary relationships are
involved, where a large amount of money is handled, where employment involves care taking, or
any of the jobs enumerated by the Employee Privacy Protection Act.74 Whether background
checks are performed by employers or by companies hired to do the screening, the employee or
prospective employee shall receive a copy of the actual investigation.
11. Private Investigators
(a) Problem
Private investigators routinely access personal information about individuals from data brokers.
Private investigators often operate without the extensive regulation that public law enforcement
officials must heed. In some states, they are not subject to licensure; in others they are subject
only to a pro forma process. As a result, they can be a source of great abuses. The Rebecca
Schaeffer incident that sparked the passage of the Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act demonstrates
the problem. A private investigator obtained actress Rebecca Schaeffer’s home address from a
state DMV office. The investigator was working for a stalker who used the information to go to
Schaeffer’s home and murder her.75 More recently, Amy Boyer was murdered by a stalker who
had hired private investigators to locate her.76
(b) Legislative Mandate
There must be a system that ensures greater accountability in the private investigator profession.
(c) Specific Solution
Each state should be required to establish minimum standards for licensure and oversight of the
private investigator industry. Such standards should address the use of pretexting (pretending to
be another person in order to gain access to someone’s account or to gain information), establish
a duty of care to those who are investigated, and prohibit the use of invasive practices, such as
sorting through individuals’ trash, employing electronic listening devices, etc.
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D. Government Access to and Use of Personal Data
12. Limiting Government Access to Business and Financial Records
(a) Problem
Increasingly, the government is gathering personal information from businesses and financial
institutions. Companies such as ChoicePoint have multi-million dollar contracts with
government agencies to supply them with personal information. The Fourth Amendment is often
inapplicable because in a series of cases, including United States v. Miller77 and Smith v.
Maryland,78 the Court has held that whenever a third party possesses personal information, there
is no reasonable expectation of privacy. In the Information Age, it is impossible to live without
extensive information about one’s life existing in the hands of various third parties: phone
companies, cable companies, Internet Service Providers, merchants, booksellers, employers,
landlords, and so on. Thus, the government can increasingly obtain detailed information about a
person without ever entering her home
(b) Legislative Mandate
There must be a way to engage in electronic commerce and routine transactions without losing
one’s expectation of privacy in personal data.
(c) Specific Solution
Whenever the government attempts to access personal information from third parties that
maintain record systems of personal information (databases or other records of personally
identifiable information on more than one individual), the government should be required to
obtain a special court order that requires probable cause and particularized suspicion that the
information sought involves evidence of a crime. Exceptions should exist for reasonable law
enforcement needs, including emergency circumstances.
13. Government Data Mining
(a) Problem
The government is increasingly researching, planning, and initiating data mining endeavors.
Data mining entails combining and analyzing various records of personal information for
suspicious patterns of behavior. This was envisioned on a grand scale with the Total Information
Awareness project. Due to a public outcry, Congress nixed the program from the public budget.
But a recent GAO report as well as the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee report
demonstrates that a number of government data mining programs are underway.79 Data mining
77
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threatens to undermine a longstanding Fourth Amendment principle, which holds that dragnet
searches – those without prior particularized suspicion – are impermissible. Because there are
serious inaccuracies in dossiers created by commercial data brokers, innocent people may be
swept into these dragnets. Furthermore, the profiles and algorithms used to determine suspicious
patterns of behavior are often kept secret, thus impeding public accountability or judicial
oversight, and providing no way to find out the extent of use of certain factors such as race,
religion, and First Amendment activity.
(b) Legislative Mandate
There must be a way to ensure that government data mining does not permit law enforcement to
engage in dragnet searches for prospective crimes. Where data mining is employed, it should
occur in as open a way as possible with adequate judicial oversight and public accountability.
(c) Specific Solution
Subject to judicial oversight and normal search warrant requirements, prospective subject-based
data mining should be permitted. Subject-based data mining involves analyzing records where a
specific individual or individuals are identified and where there is particularized suspicion that
they are involved in criminal activity. Pattern-based data mining presents greater difficulties.
Prospective pattern-based data mining involves analyzing record systems for various suspicious
patterns of activity and then investigating those individuals who meet the particular pattern or
profile. Pattern-based data mining should be generally prohibited, as it involves a dragnet
search. However, with appropriate judicial supervision and with a way to preserve the principle
of particularized suspicion, pattern-based data mining should be permitted in cases where there
are specific and articulable facts that a particular crime will or has occurred, that a particular
limited type of record system (not a broad dossier) has information that is necessary to the
investigation (no alternatives available), and where the inquiry into the record system is limited.
Data mining profiles must be approved by a court prior to use and must be revealed to the public
once the investigation is over. Moreover, as is currently done with wiretapping, government
agencies engaging in data mining shall produce annual public reports to Congress describing the
frequency and nature of their data mining activities.
14. Control of Government Maintenance of Personal Information
(a) Problem
The Privacy Act of 1974 is riddled with loopholes. Despite a requirement that government
agencies disclose new record systems, they can readily avert other substantive requirements
simply by declaring that they want to exempt these records. For instance, in 2003, the Justice
Department administratively discharged the FBI of its statutory duty to ensure the accuracy and
completeness of the over 39 million criminal records it maintains in its National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) database.80 That database provides over 80,000 law enforcement
agencies with access to data on wanted persons, missing persons, gang members, as well as
information about stolen cars, boats, and other information. Aside from agencies exempting
80
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themselves from the requirements of the act, agencies have also employed the “routine use”
exemption in such a broad fashion that it contravenes the intent of the Privacy Act. Another
limitation of the Privacy Act is that it is very difficult for plaintiffs to obtain remedies. Plaintiffs
must prove a “willful or intentional” violation of the Act, which is difficult since many agency
actions are negligent or reckless. Moreover, in Doe v. Chao,81 the Court held that plaintiffs suing
for violations of the Privacy Act must prove actual loss in order to obtain minimum damages of
$1000 under the Act. Although many plaintiffs whose personal information is leaked by an
agency suffer emotional distress, for many courts such emotional distress is not sufficient to
constitute an actual loss. Accordingly, such plaintiffs are left without a remedy.
(b) Legislative Mandate
There must be meaningful regulation limiting the collection of personal data, acceptable uses,
accuracy, security, and retention of personal information by government agencies, especially
since they are acquiring more and more data about individuals.
(c) Specific Solution
The Privacy Act must be updated. Over thirty years have gone by without a major reexamination of the Privacy Act, and one is sorely needed. Congress should empanel a new
Privacy Protection Study Committee to examine government use of personal information
comprehensively and make recommendations for legislation to update the Privacy Act. Specific
changes shall include, but shall not be limited to: (1) limiting the routine use exception; (2)
addressing the outsourcing of personal information processing to private sector businesses; (3)
strengthening the enforcement provisions of the Act; and (4) overturning Doe v. Chao.82 so that
violations of the Act are remedied by minimum damages provisions.

E. Privacy Innovation and Enforcement
15. Preserving the Innovative Role of the States
(a) Problem
The recently enacted amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act preempted more protective
state laws. As a result, states are less able to pass effective identity theft and privacy protections.
(b) Legislative Mandate
The ability of states to innovate new approaches to privacy protections must be preserved.

81
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(c) Specific Solution
Most privacy protections in America have been created by state legislatures. The security breach
law that resulted in ChoicePoint disclosing the recent sale of personal information to criminals
was developed in California. Many of the most important protections in the Fair Credit
Reporting Act originated in the states. Indeed, as Justice Brandeis once noted: “It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.”83 Legislation crafted to address privacy problems should only employ “floor
preemption,” thereby allowing states to innovate more comprehensive protections for individual
rights.
16. Effective Enforcement of Privacy Rights
(a) Problem
Often, privacy rights are difficult to enforce. In many instances, it is difficult for victims to
establish damages or causation when leaks or improper uses of their personal information result
in identity theft or other harms. When a company discloses a person’s data or violates its privacy
policy by wrongfully transferring data to other companies or not providing adequate security, it
is often difficult to prove actual damages. As a result, companies often lack sufficient
accountability and sanctions when they engage in wrongdoing. About half of identity theft
victims cannot tell how their personal information was even accessed, and thus do not know
what parties should be pursued legally. Moreover, it is very difficult for identity theft victims to
prove actual monetary damages even though they have spent considerable time fixing the harm
and suffered great mental distress. With the ChoicePoint security debacle, people’s personal
information was sold to identity thieves. Although many did not suffer from identity theft, they
still suffered harm, as they are now much more vulnerable to identity theft, have considerable
mental unease, and must spend significantly more time monitoring their credit and accounts over
a period that could last years.
(b) Legislative Mandate
There must be a way to ensure that privacy protections are enforced with meaningful sanctions
as well as provide meaningful redress to victims.
(c) Specific Solution
There should be minimum liquidated damages provisions for companies that violate their privacy
policies or that suffer a security breach due to negligence. Statutes must provide for individual
redress. As part of an enforcement effort, individuals should be able to obtain an order to have a
commercial data broker audited. In the event of leaked information, the most effective way to
address the problem in a way that avoids extensive class action litigation is to authorize state
attorneys general to fine companies and establish a fund where victims can make claims for
83
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disbursements.

III. COMMENTARY
Version 1.1 of the Model Regime, which we released on March 10, 2005, received
considerable attention. It has been discussed in testimony at legislatures at the federal and state
level. We received a number of very thoughtful comments and read many insightful discussions
across the blogosphere.84. The comments we received range from being very supportive of the
Model Regime to being very critical. In this section, we respond to some of the comments and
criticisms to the Model Regime. This section will continue to be developed in subsequent
versions as we receive comments and feedback.

A. General Comments
Eric Goldman, Assistant Professor at Marquette University School of Law, comments
that the Model Regime has no cost/benefit analysis. He contends that “investments in increased
privacy are like investments in security—they may end up being infrastructural investments that
ultimately prove to be ‘wasted’ investments in terms of social welfare they create.”85 Many of
the solutions proposed are not very costly. With respect to those that do impose costs on
business, it must be noted that identity theft costs businesses tens billions of dollars a year.86 If
the solutions have just a moderate effect on identity theft, they could pay for themselves.
Additionally, the business community has been loathe to recognize the costs of a lack of
privacy to individuals, which includes lost time, frustration with direct marketing, and sometimes
increased vulnerability to violent crime. For instance, an anonymous commentator who works in
the credit industry wrote to us that “since federal law right now does not hold them [identity theft
victims] liable for fraud accounts or the misuse of their accounts, there really is no harm you are
protecting against. . . .”87 In contrast, we believe that identity theft causes significant harm to
individuals. According to estimates, victims spend on average 200 hours and thousands of
dollars fixing the damage.88 The harm is not simply measured in lost dollars; identity theft
causes incalculable mental distress. Victims feel helpless, and the ongoing nature of identity
theft exacerbates these feelings. Most other crimes have an ending point, in which victims can
recover and begin to cope. Identity theft can last for years, even after detection, thus creating a
perpetual sense of victimization that has no apparent ending. Moreover, victims are often
financially crippled, and they can no longer engage in many financial transactions freely (such as
obtaining loans, mortgages, etc.) until the damage to their credit is fixed. We can find little
evidence that these costs to the consumer have been adequately taken into account by businesses.
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The Model Regime aims to force businesses to internalize some of the costs they impose on
consumers. To this extent, it increases costs on businesses, but such increases are justified.
“Roy Owens” comments on Bruce Schneier’s blog that defamation laws could address
inaccurate information flows.89 Defamation actions are costly to bring, and damages might be
hard to prove. In egregious cases where errors result in denial of loans or wrongful arrest,
plaintiffs might have a powerful case, but defamation law will not provide adequate incentives to
protect against many of the smaller errors that often crop up in databases. These errors can cause
harm, but not enough to support an expensive lawsuit. We also note that under theFCRA,
consumer reporting agencies are shielded from defamation prosecution, except in cases where
there was malice or willful behavior.90 This legislative bargain gives the consumer reporting
agencies flexibility to collect and report information as long as they use procedures to ensure
“maximum possible accuracy.”
Eric Grimm, an attorney with Calligaro & Meyering, P.C., and others suggest that any
regulatory regime would be compromised by the fact that agencies may be captured by the
companies that they regulate.91 We do not disagree, but we do not believe that this is a reason to
reject regulatory solutions. Agency capture is a risk with any regulatory action. Despite agency
capture problems, few would argue that we are better off without regulatory regimes for food,
drugs, the environment, auto safety, and the like. Moreover, the risk of agency capture is
mitigated when state attorneys general can prosecute wrongdoing, where individuals have a
private right of action, and where federal regulation is a floor and thus allows states to create
broader protections. All of these are central features of our Model Regime.
Matthew Miller, an attorney at Hughes & Luce LLP, blogging on Privacy Spot, praises
the Model Regime.92 Miller suggests that the Model Regime address how long should data
should be retained by entities. Jim Horning also makes a similar suggestion. Many privacy laws
set an upward limit on the amount of time private entities can store personal information,
including the Cable Communications Policy Act, the Video Privacy Protection Act, and the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.93 We have incorporated this suggestion into the Model Regime.
Dennis Bailey, author of the book The Open Society Paradox, argues that “the free flow
of data provides significant economic and social benefits and regulations that attempt to restrict it
only serve to hurt the economy.”94 We agree that the collection and use of personal information
can provide substantial benefits, but we disagree that any regulation of the free flow of data will
necessarily impede economic development. We live in a highly regulated society. At the time of
the New Deal, similar arguments were made in support of laissez faire. Indeed, one response to
the problems of the Industrial Age (pollution, poor worker conditions, etc.) was that any
regulation would injure economic development. Regulation is not necessarily in tension with
89
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economic development, and many regulations benefit the economy and support innovation where
there have been market failures.
Moreover, the free flow of information and maximizing economic development are not
the only normative ends of our society. Information regulation can serve to promote fairness or
prevent a panoply of types of discrimination. For example, since the 1970s, it has been illegal
under federal anti-discrimination laws to exclusively rely upon an arrest record to make hiring
decisions, as minorities are more heavily targeted by law enforcement: “Blacks and Hispanics
are convicted in numbers which are disproportionate to Whites and . . . barring people from
employment based on their conviction records will therefore disproportionately exclude those
groups. Due to this adverse impact, an employer may not base an employment decision on the
conviction record of an applicant or an employee absent business necessity.”95
Dennis Bailey suggests in his blog that personal information should generally be public,
and that regulation should only focus on the harmful uses of personal information: “If
information is being used to deprive someone of their freedoms, such as the right to vote or the
ability to get a job; or used to defraud someone through identity theft then the full weight of the
law should be applied. But to regulate data simply on the basis of privacy is not something I
support.”96 It is not practical to take such an approach. Limiting the public disclosure of certain
data as a precaution is a first line of defense for individuals such as judges, workers at medical
clinics performing abortions, and domestic violence victims. The use of criminal law alone to
address identity theft has been a failure. Gartner, Inc., a research firm, estimates that far less
than 1% of identity thefts result in a conviction.97 A U.S. General Accounting Office Report
describes in compelling detail the difficulties with criminal investigation and prosecution of
identity theft cases.98
Jim Harper, Director of Information Policy Studies at the Cato Institute comments that
regulation “at its best proscribes a set of actions in order to prevent harm,” and criticizes
regulations that seek to prevent behavior not tied to “monetary loss, property loss, or mental
distress that causes physical symptoms, loss of work, or destruction of family and professional
relationships.”99 Harper contends that common law torts could address the problems much more
effectively than our Model Regime of regulatory provisions.
The problem with applying common law torts is that data privacy harms are often illdefined and under-developed in the common law. To what extent is an individual harmed if an
intruder enters her home, looks through her papers, but doesn’t steal anything and leaves without
a trace? To what extent is an individual harmed whose personal data is leaked by a company
such as ChoicePoint but who thus far has not been victimized in an identity theft? Perhaps the
common law could better address data privacy if it were to come to a different conception of
harm. As Warren and Brandeis noted in their seminal article on privacy, the law evolved to
95
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address more than just property loss and physical harm.100 After the Warren and Brandeis
article, the law developed to recognize the more incorporeal and emotional harms associated
with privacy violations.101 But the common law has a long way to develop. It must recognize
duties on the part of data brokers such as ChoicePoint. It must address issues of causation, as it
is often impossible for victims to prove how their identity was stolen and which companies were
responsible for the identity thief’s obtaining the victim’s personal data. And it must develop a
concept of harm that does not depend upon severe emotional distress, reputational harm, or
actual monetary loss, as such harms are very difficult to prove when people’s data is merely
leaked, when people are denied access to their information, or when people’s information is
improperly transferred to other entities. Common law torts can certainly supplement a regulatory
regime, but they cannot serve as an adequate replacement for it without significant development.
Michael Sankey, CEO of BRB Publications, a company that monitors government record
access policies, made significant comments on the Model Regime.102 Sankey notes that the
Model Regime “would be more useful if it recognized the existence of different vendors and
what they do, rather than to primarily lump them together as ‘data brokers.’” Sankey describes
five general categories of public record vendors: “proprietary database vendors,” companies that
“combine public sources of bulk data and/or online access to develop their own database
product(s)” and “purchase or license records from other information vendors.” “Gateways” are
companies that “provide automated electronic gateway to Proprietary Database Vendors or to
government agencies online systems.” “Search firms” are companies that “furnish public record
search and document retrieval services using online services and/or through a network of
specialists, including their own employees or correspondents.” “Verification firms” are
companies that ensure information provided to employers and businesses is correct. “Private
investigation firms” are companies that “use public records as tools rather than as ends in
themselves, in order to create an overall, comprehensive ‘picture’ of an individual or company
for a particular purpose.” These distinctions are informative, and should be considered when
legislative packages are introduced to address the field of commercial data brokers. We also
note that in some cases, commercial data brokers perform many of the different functions
described by Sankey.
Although commercial data broker ChoicePoint did not comment on the Model Regime,
the company did announce a series of changes to its business model in March 2005. ChoicePoint
stated that it “will discontinue the sale of information products that contain sensitive consumer
data, including Social Security and driver’s license numbers, except where there is a specific
consumer-driven transaction or benefit, or where the products support federal, state or local
government and criminal justice purposes.”103 The company also has created “an independent
office of Credentialing, Compliance and Privacy that will . . . oversee improvements in customer
credentialing processes, the expansion of a site visit-based verification program and
implementation of procedures to expedite the reporting of incidents.”104
We think ChoicePoint’s reforms are inadequate to address the privacy implications of the
commercial data broker industry. First, ChoicePoint’s reforms do not bind the company’s
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competitors, and so other commercial data brokers can continue to sell SSNs and other personal
information.105
Second, Choicepoint is still going to sell its unregulated “public records” reports to small
businesses, albeit with the SSN or driver license “truncated.”106 Large businesses and law
enforcement will still be able to obtain the full report with sensitive information. It is not clear
how the SSN will be truncated. Some companies obscure the first five digits while others block
the last four. Without a full redaction of the SSN, it may be possible to piece the SSN together
from several sources.
Third, these public records reports sold by Choicepoint have been shown to be highly
inaccurate. According to a report by Pam Dixon of the World Privacy Forum, Choicepoint’s
public information reports have a very high error rate. In her sample, 90% of the reports
obtained contained errors; frequently these errors were serious, such as individuals being
identified by the wrong sex.107 Dixon’s initial findings are supported by anecdotal stories of
other individuals who have obtained their unregulated Choicepont reports. Elizabeth Rosen, a
victim of the Choicepoint privacy breach, found that five of the six pages of her report contained
errors.108 Rosen’s report erroneously indicated that she was the officer of businesses in Texas,
that she maintained a private mail box at “Mailboxes Etc.,” and that she owned businesses,
including a “Zach’s Cheese and Deli.” Privacy researcher Richard Smith obtained his
Choicepoint report and wrote that his report “contain[ed] more misinformation than correct
information.”109 Deborah Pierce’s National Comprehensive Report from ChoicePoint falsely
indicated a “possible Texas criminal history.”110
Fourth, individuals will have access, but not correction rights with respect to
Choicepoint’s unregulated public information reports. Choicepoint claims that they cannot
correct these reports because they are generated from public records. However, this claim is
deceptive--the problem is that Choicepoint is mixing up public record information between
individuals. The public records are correct, but they are attached to people to whom they do not
pertain.
Fifth, nothing binds Choicepoint to its promise to maintain its reformed policies. In
recent years, many large companies including eBay.com, Amazon.com, drkoop.com, and
yahoo.com changed users’ privacy settings or altered privacy policies to the detriment of
users.111 Choicepoint is legally in a better position to renege on its promises, as it does not
105

According to journalist Jonathan Krim: “So far, neither those moves nor revelations of a series of breaches at
major banks and universities has curbed a multi-tiered and sometimes shadowy marketplace of selling and re-selling
personal data that is vulnerable to similar fraud.” Jonathan Krim, Net Aids Access to Sensitive ID Data, Social
Security Numbers Are Widely Available, Apr. 4, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A23686-2005Apr3.html.
106
“ChoicePoint will continue to serve most of its core markets and customers, but these actions will have an impact
on the scope of products offered to some customers and the availability of information products in certain market
segments, particularly small businesses. The transition will begin immediately and is expected to be substantially
completed within 90 days.” Id.
107
After the Breach: How Secure and Accurate is Consumer Information Held by ChoicePoint and Other Data
Aggregators?, Before the California Senate Banking Committee, Mar. 30, 2005 (testimony of Pam Dixon, Executive
Director, World Privacy Forum).
108
Id. (testimony of Elizabeth Rosen, Registered Nurse).
109
Richard Smith, My FBI File (You Have One Too), Privacy Foundation, May 11, 2001.(on file with authors).
110
Bob Sullivan, ChoicePoint Files Found Riddled With Errors, MSNBC, Mar 8, 2005, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7118767/.
111
Chris J. Hoofnagle, Consumer Privacy In the E-Commerce Marketplace 2002, Third Annual Institute on Privacy

26

SOLOVE & HOOFNAGLE

MODEL PRIVACY REGIME

acknowledge a direct relationship with consumers that could be the basis of a legal action.
Choicepoint’s “consumers” are the businesses that buy data from the company.
Sixth, Choicepoint still is reserving the right to sell “sensitive” personal information to
businesses in a large number of contexts. Choicepoint’s release states that sensitive information
will be sold to “[s]upport consumer-driven transactions where the data is needed to complete or
maintain relationships . . .[p]rovide authentication or fraud prevention tools to large, accredited
corporate customers where consumers have existing relationships . . . [a]ssist federal, state and
local government and criminal justice agencies in their important missions.” These categories
articulated by Choicepoint are broad and ill-defined. What specifically falls under “consumerdriven transactions”? When is data “needed to complete or maintain relationships?” Under this
standard, Choicepoint can decide what a consumer benefit is. In the past, Choicepoint has
declared that selling personal information benefits consumers in the aggregate, and thus
individuals should have no right to opt-out of Choicepoint’s databases.112 Simply put,
Choicepoint’s idea of what benefits consumers differs from what consumers and consumers
advocates think benefits them.
Seventh, the Choicepoint policy allows the company to sell full reports for anti-fraud
purposes. While in theory this exception seems appropriate, almost any transaction can have
some fraud risk. If a broad fraud exemption is maintained, it will allow the sale of reports even
when the fraud risk is minimal or a proxy for wishing to collect information for some other
purpose.
Finally, Choicepoint’s proposal does not at all limit sale of personal information to law
enforcement. The company continues to sell personal information to 7,000 federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies.113

B. Comments on Specific Proposals
1. Universal Notice. Eric Goldman questions the breadth of the definition in this
proposal, and notes that “virtually every Internet company would be covered by the standard.”114
We disagree that the standard would cover virtually any Internet company. It would cover any
company that has a primary business of selling personal information.
Jim Horning, Chief Scientist at McAfee Research,115 comments that in light of the digital
divide, notice should be available to those who are not online. As our original proposal was
Law 1339, Practicing Law Institute G0-00W2 (June 2002), available at
http://www.epic.org/epic/staff/hoofnagle/plidraft2002.pdf.
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based on the use of a website to provide such notice, we have adjusted the Universal Notice
section to ensure that those offline also receive notice.
An anonymous commentator who works in the credit industry writes that the definition of
commercial data broker should not include consumer reporting agencies because “they are well
known and they have specific obligations that cover most of the concerns enumerated in your
paper.” 116 We agree with this assessment. The purpose of the Model Regime is primarily to
expand the duties on companies that have functions falling outside the FCRA. However, some
portions of the Model Regime do impose greater responsibilities on traditional consumer
reporting agencies, such as proposal #4.
.
2. Meaningful Informed Consent. Rich Kulawiec, Internet Security Architect at Fire on
the Mountain, LLC, suggests that the exemption to consent for fraud investigations is too broad,
and that individuals should receive notice when an investigation does not result in a finding of
fraud.117 Kulawiec argues that this would prevent baseless uses of data for anti-fraud purposes,
and allow people to correct data that led the business to suspect fraud. We adjusted this principle
to allow use without consent for “reasonable” fraud investigations. Providing notice each time a
company used data to perform some anti-fraud function would be burdensome, and we think
requiring a condition of reasonableness to investigations will prevent arbitrary uses of personal
information under the exemption.
3. One-Step Exercise of Rights. “Curt Sampson,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s
blog, and Jim Horning make a number of important points regarding the security of any
centralized source created to manage privacy rights. Sampson correctly points out that such a
system will have problems in identifying and authenticating individuals who seek access to it. In
lieu of such a system, Sampson proposes that commercial data brokers adopt an opt-in business
model, where they have to contact the data subjects and establish relationship with each one. We
believe that such an alternative might result in a barrage of unwanted contact to individuals given
the many companies that trade in people’s data. Many of the identification and authentication
issues Sampson raises are addressed successfully by the FTC in its Do-Not-Call Telemarketing
Registry. The FTC uses “automatic number identification” to verify that an individual enrolling
in the system is calling from the affected number.
Serious security issues are not presented by requiring the commercial data brokers to
register and provide information about their activities online. The security issues arise when
individuals can exercise rights at the registry. This can be addressed in several ways. With
respect to the congressionally-mandated central source for free consumer reports, the individual
can go to a single web site, but then be passed off to an individual consumer reporting agency for
identification and authentication. A privacy registry could operate in the same way, with the
individual reading about different commercial data brokers on the central registry, but then
pursing the exercise of certain rights (especially access and correction) with the individual
companies.
In some instances, the harms from abuse are not significant enough to outweigh the
benefits of a central registry. For instance, some direct marketing groups objected to the Do118
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Not-Call Registry on the basis that an imposter could secretly opt-out individuals by placing
them on the Do-Not-Call Registry without their consent. We think the FTC properly resolved
this conflict by still allowing individuals to opt-out without the hassle of burdensome
authentication because missing some telemarketing is an acceptable harm in exchange for ease of
use. Similarly, with respect to opting out of financial services information sharing, there should
not be significant hurdles or the requirement to go to each individual company to authenticate
and opt out. Instead, the FTC could monitor enrollments in the system, and investigate those that
appear to have a fraudulent pattern (multiple opt outs from the same IP address, opt outs that
come in alphabetical or numerical order, etc).
To address Curt Samson’s concerns, we have adjusted the Model Regime so that certain
rights can be exercised at the centralized system, but others will have to pursued with individual
companies.
“David Mohring,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog, raises a different issue with the
centralized source: it could become a honeypot for law enforcement and lawyers seeking
personal information. This indeed is a risk. The FTC, in creating the Do-Not-Call Registry,
established a routine use allowing the agency to disclose enrollment information to law
enforcement agencies.119 To avoid a similar development with respect to any newly-created
system, we have altered the Model Regime to specify that government officials seeking access to
personal information in the registration system be required to obtain a search warrant with
probable cause and to minimize the data acquisition to only that needed for a specificallyidentified law enforcement purpose.
Rich Kulawiec comments that the Do-Not-Call Registry has a feedback loop that our
system lacks. That is, if one continues to receive telemarketing after enrollment, there is a
possibility that someone is violating the law. He rightly asks what mechanisms will ensure
compliance with our proposed system. This is a legitimate concern, but a fully developed
approach would create rights that would help individuals identify when something wrong is
afoot, and strong penalties (suggested by many who commented on the Model Regime) would
serve as a deterrence to prevent misuse of personal data. To further develop a feedback
mechanism for individuals as data subjects, we have added a provision to the access section
calling upon commercial data brokers to not only provide a copy of a report, but also an
accounting of the entities to which it has been disclosed. This right exists in the FCRA context,
where the individual can obtain a complete list of all entities that received a consumer report.120
Therefore, in the access and accuracy section (proposal #5), we have added a provision to enable
an individual to seek such an accounting of a commercial data broker’s disclosures.
4. Individual Credit Management. “No id please,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s
blog, notes that credit card companies have architected the current credit system that has put
consumers at risk, and then turned this risk into a business opportunity to market credit
monitoring. This comment is correct—the information business has turned many of its problems
into new profit opportunities, such as identity theft insurance, which can cover lost wages and
fees associated with remedying the crime. Dennis Bailey observes: “I use CreditWatch from
Experian and it gives me peace of mind. Of course [Solove and Hoofnagle] are asking the
companies to give away a profitable service for free.”121 It strikes us as unfair for companies to
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make a profit selling a service to protect consumers from problems created by these very
companies themselves. Consumer reporting agencies contend that people’s information would be
much more safe and secure if they signed up for their credit monitoring services.122 However,
under theFCRA, consumer reporting agencies are required to maintain procedures to ensure
“maximum possible accuracy,” and nowhere in the statute does it authorize companies to charge
a fee for such service.123 We believe that under their FCRA duty to maintain the maximum
possible accuracy, consumer reporting agencies should be providing free credit monitoring to
individuals.124 Therefore, we have added to this provision free credit monitoring to individuals
who desire it.
“Matthew B,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog, argues in support of the security
freeze proposal. He points out that it will serve as an effective identity theft “detection
approach” because it will notify individuals where there may be wrongdoing. Such an approach
is useful because in a typical identity theft situation, the impostor will make a number of
attempts to apply for credit in the victim’s name. Notice of inquiries will alert an individual to
wrongdoing; the freeze will stop the actual granting of credit, assuming that the impostor cannot
himself lift the freeze.
Rich Kulawiec suggests that notice of access or attempted access to personal information
not be delivered by e-mail because of security risks. Our approach would give the individual a
choice regarding which method of notice could be used; those concerned about e-mail security
could choose notice by postal mail.
An anonymous commentator who works in the credit industry writes that “[r]equiring a
notice to be sent by a . . . [consumer reporting agency] . . . each time someone makes an inquiry
or accesses your consumer report is just not practical.”125 The anonymous commentator is
correct. Our original proposal would have required notice to be given each time a company does
a routine review of an existing consumer’s credit. The Model Regime is not concerned with
routine account review, but rather with new accounts of credit and new inquiries made on the
file. We have accordingly altered the Model Regime so that new persons or entities (those that
do not currently have a business relationship with the consumer) that access or make an inquiry
on the report will trigger a notice to the consumer.
The same commentator writes that “[a]llowing full consumer control over their credit file
. . . is not practical . . . .because [of] the need to have a center available 24/7/365 to allow
consumers to have access to their file.” This would “create a cost structure that would destroy
the industry.” Certainly there will be costs involved with credit freeze, but under the current
information architecture, individuals have no tools to proactively shield themselves from identity
theft. There are certain pressure points that can be used to address identity theft. One is limiting
access to personal information, an approach that commercial data brokers have made impractical.
The other approach is to limit access to the consumer report, because without it, companies will
not grant credit to impostors. We think consumers should have the ability to limit access to the
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reports. An increasing number of states are in accord with this position.126
5. Access to and Accuracy of Personal Information. Michael Sankey correctly notes
that our original proposal justified access, accuracy, and correction rights by listing uses of
personal information (pre-employment screening and credit granting) that are already regulated
and subject to the very rights we seek. Our reliance on those uses of information was misplaced,
and thus we have removed those justifications. We still think that these rights are appropriate for
reports sold by commercial data brokers, as law enforcement and other entities use them to make
decisions about people’s lives.
Sankey also comments that correction rights are difficult to execute, because the
“originating data comes from the government agencies [and] the database vendor is merely
reporting what was in the record.”127 While it is true that individuals have to pursue correction
rights with individual government agencies, as noted above, much of the problem stems from the
fact that although the public records are correct, they are attached to the wrong individuals.
6. Secure Identification. “Anonymous,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog, warns
that legislative mandates defining security can cause problems because they stifle innovation and
technological development.128 We agree with this comment. In our Model Regime, we avoided
specifying specific security standards. Privacy laws that address security standards rarely define
specific security measures, but place a burden to maintain “reasonable procedures.” These
standards place a continuing burden upon data collectors to employ good practices rather than set
the standards in stone. However, this does not mean that the law must avoid all specific
measures. In particular, some existing security measures have proven to be ineffective – such as
the use of SSNs as passwords – that they should be specifically limited. There may be some
security measures that have proven so effective that they should be required. Such instances
should be employed sparingly, as the law should maximize flexibility and continued security
innovation.
“Gary,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog, suggests that the SSN be made public,
but that the law should prohibit its use as a password.129 We agree that the SSN should not be
used as a password. However, the SSN is an individual’s “account number” with the Social
Security Administration, and making such a financial account number public could create
opportunities for fraud and abuse
Jim Horning and several others are critical of the employment of passwords.130 Users
choose bad passwords; they tend to use the same password for many different purposes; and they
forget good passwords. All of these problems are valid concerns, but the current system is a
password system that is among the worst that could possibly be devised. SSNs are used as
126
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passwords; they are far from secret; they can readily be found out with minimal effort; they are
very difficult to change; and they are used on countless accounts and record systems. The Model
Regime’s password proposal eliminates several of these problems. First, passwords will vary
with different accounts, so a thief’s finding out a password will not unlock everything. Second,
passwords can readily be changed, so once the identity theft is detected, people can readily
render the stolen password useless. Third, it will be much more difficult for the average identity
thief to guess people’s passwords. Of course, thieves can do this, but it will make identity thefts
more difficult. It is difficult to completely eliminate identity theft, but the Model Regime makes
it much harder to engage in and makes it easier for victims to halt it once it happens. The
problem of forgetting passwords can be addressed by having people supply answers to questions
such as naming their favorite pet’s name or favorite color.
We have received some interesting technological solutions for identification and
authentication, but we were reluctant to adopt any without a more throughout understanding of
their implications, feasibility, usability, and potential problems.131 We are open to other
approaches that provide more flexibility and security than passwords. For now, we believe that
passwords are an easy measure that will have a significant impact on reducing the incidence and
severity of identity theft. While such a solution is not perfect, its great virtue is that it supplies a
substantial advance in effectiveness with relative simplicity.
7. Disclosure of Security Breaches. Eric Goldman suggests that individuals be able to
control whether security breach notifications are received, and the standard for receiving
notifications should be opt in. We agree that individuals should be able to opt out of receiving
notifications, should they wish. However, setting an opt in standard will give companies an
incentive to hide the option from the consumer, or charge consumers for receiving this basic
information.
8. Social Security Number Use Limitation. Many wrote to express support of this
provision in particular. Several wrote that the SSN should be consider compromised because of
its widespread use and availability. Thus, it should never be used as a password.
9. Access and Use Restrictions for Public Records. No commentary.
10. Curbing Excessive Uses of Background Checks. Jim Horning argues that the
background check section is not relevant to the problems we aimed to address in the Model
Regime. However, the growth of the commercial databroker industry has been in large part due
to employers performing background checks, even in cases where the job has no security
function. Outside the pre-employment context, shoddy, electronic-only background checks have
become increasingly less expensive. There has to be some way to put balance back into this
situation and limit the contexts in which background checks should be performed.
Dennis Bailey contends that many non-security jobs could have security implications; he
gives the example of felons working for service companies that might assault people in their
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homes. We think that some line must be drawn that establishes categories of jobs that are
available without a background check. Almost any job imaginable has some security
implication, but the connection is often attenuated. We think the line that we have drawn, one
that allows background checks for caretakers, handlers of large sums of money, and for functions
articulated by Congress in the Polygraph Act, properly balances employer and employee
interests.
Michael Sankey of BRB Publications, Inc. criticizes the background check section, and
notes that “the employer can be sued for negligent hiring if [pre-employment screens] are not
done.”132 We think this is precisely the reason why a line must be drawn. As pre-employment
screening becomes cheaper, it becomes difficult for employers to refrain from engaging in prescreening. One could foresee the day when even the most menial job will require a clean record.
11. Private Investigators. Jim Horning recommends against limiting the private
investigator profession, arguing that private investigators are not central to the problems at issue
in the Model Regime. We disagree. Private investigators are frequent users of the information
provided by data brokers. Too little is known about this industry. Certainly, there are beneficial
examples of private investigators using personal information (i.e., to locate lost children). But
private investigators engage in other practices that the public is largely unaware of. Moreover,
there are many instances of private investigators assisting unscrupulous individuals, stalkers, and
others bent on violence. For example, the stalker who murdered Rebecca Shaeffer obtained her
address from a private investigator.133 We believe that because private investigators engage in a
significant amount of personal information use that they should be subject to the Model Regime
just as other principal users of such data are. Failure to address private investigators would leave
a significant gap in protection.
12. Limiting Government Access to Business and Financial Records. Michael Sankey
questions the logic of this section. He notes that requiring the government to obtain court process
“is extremely time consuming and costly” and that the government “can utilize the services of a
private sector public record database vendors to do the same search of the same government
agencies in a fraction of the time for a fraction of the cost.”134 But this is exactly our point—
access and aggregation have tipped the scale of power away from the individual to the
government. Using public records or information volunteered from private companies, the
government can learn much more about its citizens than it could a century or even a decade ago.
13. Government Data Mining. The section on government data mining has received
much attention from commentators. Jim Harper argues in support of our proposal that “to the
extent [that data mining] means sifting through databases trying to discover incipient
wrongdoing . . . [it is] probably ineffective.”135 Others criticize the proposal, arguing that the
government should be able to employ the same tools that the private sector uses for marketing.
For example, Dennis Bailey argues that restricting government data mining would “keep

132

Email from Michael Sankey, BRB Publications, Inc., Mar. 3, 2005 (on file with authors).
139 Cong. Rec. S15762 (Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Senator Barbara Boxer).
134
Sankey email, supra.
135
Email from Jim Harper to Declan McCullagh, Chris Hoofnagle, and Daniel Solove (Mar. 14, 2005) (on file with
authors).
133

33

SOLOVE & HOOFNAGLE

MODEL PRIVACY REGIME

government inefficient by depriving it of tools from the private sector.”136 Some of the criticism,
we think, flows from a misunderstanding of our proposal. We have proposed limits on data
mining for prospective wrongdoing. Data mining regularly occurs, and with good reason, to
address crimes that have already occurred (a form of data matching was used to help identify the
Washington, DC-area sniper, for instance). Data mining prospectively to interdict future crimes
raises profound due process questions, and it is that practice that we have sought to address in
this principle.
In his book, Dennis Bailey elaborates on his support for government data mining and
contends that the problems created by data mining can be minimized by avoiding a “centralized
data warehouse.”137 Bailey observes that the government could search multiple databases with a
subpoena or court order and “[o]nly when a suspicious pattern turned up would an individual be
identified, most likely after court approval was obtained.”138 This suggestion resembles one
made in the Markle Report, which recommends against centralization such as in the Total
Information Awareness program. According to the Markle Report, “[a]ttempting to centralize
this information is not the answer because it would not link the information to the dispersed
analytical capabilities of the network.”139 In other words, the Report suggests that the
government enlist the assistance of various companies and other entities to conduct the data
mining. Moreover, the Report recommends that “personally identifiable data can be anonymized
so that personal data is not seen unless and until the requisite showing . . . is made.”140 The
problem with this suggestion is that merely decentralizing the databases does not provide
adequate protection when such information can readily be combined at the push of a button.
Such outsourcing of government intelligence functions presents other problems as well, as
private sector entities lack the openness and accountability of government as well as the legal
limitations on the collection and use of personal data. Anonymizing the identities of data
subjects and searching for patterns only to identify those suspicious people still involves a
dragnet search. Concealing the names at the stage of the initial pattern analysis will provide little
meaningful protection because they do not change the dragnet nature of the search and because
the searches for patterns are conducted by computers for which the names of the individuals will
not be relevant anyway.
14. Control of Government Maintenance of Personal Information. Jim Harper
observes in agreement that the Privacy Act requires significant revision because the Act “is a
paper tiger.” Harper contends that the Act must be revised “especially in light of the end-run
made possible by companies like ChoicePoint who do the dossier-building that the Privacy Act is
meant to prevent.”141
15. Preserving the Innovative Role of the States. Preemption continues to be one of
the more controversial proposals in the Model Regime. Eric Goldman writes, “[s]tates have no
business trying to regulate privacy. . . . . State-based regulation creates a patchwork-quilt of laws
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that cannot be reconciled, leading to unnecessary costs or a most-restrictive compliance
strategy.”142
Government and businesses have struggled for centuries to draw appropriate lines
between state and federal regulation. To simply say that the information privacy cannot be
subject to state consumer protection law begs many questions. The state has played a large
historical role in protecting consumers. Why should such a role be rejected in the context of
information privacy? What is so unique about e-commerce that justifies treating it differently
than other interstate commerce, such as catalog sales?
At some level, there is an inconsistency between the databroker industry’s declarations of
their technological capabilities to engage in personalization and customization with consumer
data and their asserted inability to use this same technology to comply with differing state
consumer privacy laws. Numerous other industries have faced differing state laws and have
found ways to comply. For example, the insurance industry has demonstrated that it can offer
state-specific quotes online, despite the fact that the industry is regulated by all 50 states. In light
of this, we remain skeptical that compliance with a “patchwork” is impossible.
Moreover, complaints about the difficulties in following the law of all 50 states are often
really disguised attacks on the law of just a few states, such as California. In many cases, only
one or two states have laws addressing a particular issue that diverge from the norm (or even
have such laws at all). Ed Mierzwinski of U.S. PIRG comments that a patchwork of state laws is
not likely if Congress “does a good enough job.”143 Mierzwinski reasons that if Congress passes
effective laws, the states will focus on other problems than privacy.
Historically, federal privacy laws have not preempted stronger state protections or
enforcement efforts. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Right to Financial Privacy
Act, the Cable Communications Privacy Act, the Video Privacy Protection Act, the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, the Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act all allow states to craft protections that exceed
federal law.144 Even the FCRA allows for stronger state law in many circumstances. 145
Although the federal government has enacted privacy laws, most privacy legislation in
the United States is enacted at the state level. Many states have privacy legislation on
employment privacy (drug testing, background checks, employment records), SSNs, video rental
data, consumer reporting, cable television records, arrest and conviction records, student records,
tax records, wiretapping, video surveillance, identity theft, library records, financial records,
insurance records, privileges (relationships between individuals that entitle communications to
privacy), and medical records.146
States have engaged in significant innovation in addressing consumer protection and
privacy issues. It was the states, not the FTC, that first acted to create telemarketing do-not-call
lists. Ed Mierzwinski of U.S. PIRG comments that “the vast majority of 2003 federal FACTA
[Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act] reforms were first passed in the states.” 147
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Jim Harper suggests that federal law should neither be a ceiling or a floor, allowing states
to regulate upward or downward—that is, provide their citizens more or less privacy.148 Harper
reasons that many people choose to have their privacy invaded, and thus states should be able to
make the choice to provide their citizens less privacy protection. Such a system, however, would
depart significantly from the general approach of federal regulation, which provides a minimum
floor of protections. Under Harper’s suggestion, federal law would amount to little more than a
recommendation, a guideline that could be followed or rejected by the states. We doubt that
such a redefinition of the role of federal law would be amenable to Congress. As for citizens
choosing to have less privacy protection, we certainly recognize that people may choose different
degrees of privacy. We have crafted our Model Regime to afford people meaningful choices
about their privacy; people are free to reject these if they want. The goal of privacy regulation is
to ensure that when people do exercise choice with regard to their privacy protection that such
choice is a meaningful choice, not a one-sided transaction where people are given few reasonable
options and not enough information to make an informed decision.
16. Effective Enforcement of Privacy Rights. Several commentators suggested that
civil penalties be severe, so as to prevent privacy violations from occurring as a “cost of doing
business.”
“Rodolphe Ortalo,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog, suggests that company
executives be criminally liable for security. A significant segment of the public agrees that
criminal liability is appropriate for those who invade privacy. However, unless there is willful or
malicious behavior, we think ordinary civil liability will suffice to deter wrongdoing.
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